THE FOURTH WORLD CONGRESS ON ANALOGY
AUGUST 29-31, 2025 CRETE, GREECE

@Jean-Yves Beziau
Jean-Yves BEZIAU
President of the Logica Universalis Association (LUA)
Vice-President of Logic and Religiom Association (LARA)
The University of Brazil, Rio de Janeiro
What Is Analogy?
ABSTRACT
Analogy is a fascinating notion that has yet to be explored, investigated, understood, in a philosophical sense, unveiling its true nature, if any.
Like for whatever notion N, to answer the question What is N?, one may balance between a chaotic enumeration of examples and overly prescriptive or abstract definitions. One way to escape these two extremes it to classify analogies into a small group of categories, each illustrated by a typical example of this kind of analogy.
And for understanding analogy, following the structuralist approach, it is important to relate it to other notions. On the one hand, we will present and describe notions close yet different from analogy, such as metaphor, similarity, and equivalence. On the other hand, we will examine opposite notions such as difference, identity, and logic.
References
J-Y.Beziau, “An Analogical Hexagon”, International Journal of Approximate Reasoning, Volume 94, March 2018, Pages 1–17
J-Y.Beziau, “Qu’est-ce que c’est?”, Lecture presented at the 25th World Congress of Philosophy, Rome, August 1-8, 2024

@the 13th SIS Congress
Tatiana DENISOVA
"Semiotics of Logic and Reasoning" Research Group, Endicott College, USA
Formerly Dean of the Faculty of Philosophy at the Surgut State University, Russia
Hermeneutic Pitfalls of Analogy
ABSTRACT
Analogy and analogical reasoning are fundamental modes of human thinking and communication. Since Aristotle’s time, the study of analogy, its essence, purpose, scope, methods of use and epistemological limitations have been examined within various sciences from various standpoints. In hermeneutics, analogy is central to understanding, interpretation and explanation
Despite the cognitive and didactic effectiveness of analogy in transferring structural information from one system to another, hermeneutic pitfalls are very probable. Hermeneutic pitfalls are communicative situations that intentionally or unintentionally involve ambiguity and might lead to misunderstanding and misinterpretation.
The article examines cases of grammatical and psychological pitfalls and their synthetic models and analyses their causes. Particular attention is paid to the analysis of the specific features of semantic transfer in the pairs “concept to concept,” “image to image,” “concept to image,” and “image to concept.” We will also examine the case of deliberate pitfall underlying the mechanism of using analogy in manipulative practices in commercial advertising and political technologies.

@Marcin Sokalski
Marcin GMYS
Editor-in-chief of Copernicus. De Musica
Editor-in-chief of Res Facta Nova (2014–2021)
Director of Polish Radio Chopin (2017–2024)
Institute of Musicology, Faculty of Art Sciences, Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznań, Poland

@the 13th SIS Congress
Dénes NAGY
President, International Society for the Interdisciplinary Study of Symmetry, Melbourne and Budapest
President, Committee for Folk Architecture, Hungarian Academy of Science, Veszprém, Hungary
Australian Catholic University, Melbourne, Australia
Logos, Analogia, and Symmetria
(Dedicated to Stanisław Jaśkowski, a Pupil of Łukasiewicz and a Pioneer of Art-Math Studies)

@Yuko Abe
Marcin J. SCHROEDER
Professor Emeritus, Akita International University (AIU), Japan
Editor-in-Chief of the journal Philosophies (MDPI)
Vice-President for Research (former President 2019-2021) of the International Society for the Study of Information (IS4SI)
Academic President of the International Society for Interdisciplinary Studies of Symmetry (SIS)
Reincarnations and Consequences of the Distinction Between Analog and Digital Information
ABSTRACT
The distinction between analog and digital information has entered the vernacular vocabulary and may seem as obvious as the meaning of the word data. Whatever is obvious, as a rule, hides an unpenetrable depth of the foundations of our thinking. The terms “analogy” (proportion) and “digit” (finger or toe) are very old and both very early acquired some association with numbers or measuring. However, their opposition is relatively new, and most likely it was introduced or at least popularized by John von Neumann in the late 1940s in the context of computing automata. [1]. He considered the opposition of the Analogy Principle and the Digital Principle where in the former numbers are represented by physical magnitudes and in the latter by “aggregates of digits”. In his explanation, he focused on the difference in the process of calculation (operations on numbers) which in analog machines involves physical interactions, and in digital machines manipulation of digits. Also, he observed that in analog machines we can never get exact outcomes of calculation due to unavoidable errors in the transition between the state of the machine and the reading of the result, but the results of digital calculations are exact. Both types of machines existed in those days, but the main direction of computing technology was in the type of digital machines mainly as a result of Alan Turing’s invention of universal computing machines whose operation can be programmed by providing appropriate information to the machine instead of restructuring its design.
The development of electronic technology has brought later different manifestations of this distinction, for instance in the way sound or music was recorded, transmitted, and reproduced. Already in von Neumann’s original writings, the focus was on the distinction between the continuous characteristic of the operation of analog machines and the discrete of digital ones. This distinction has important consequences for the theoretical description of computation and following it development of information technology. With the extraordinary importance of this technology, in the popular view, the distinction of analog-digital is identified with the opposition of continuous-discrete. In reality, all digital computers are actually analog in the sense that at the level of machinery, they operate in a continuous way, and the process of discretization is conventional to implement the computation in terms of digits [2].
Thus, what exactly is the analog-digital opposition in the context of information, not as usually assumed computing machines that all are analog in their operation? In my recent publications [3] I presented the view that the difference between analog and digital information is similar (i.e. analogous) to the difference between the concepts of physics characterizing physical systems by physical states (analog) and observables (digital). This distinction in physics acquired recognition and fundamental importance with the rise of quantum mechanics but was already present earlier, although only indirectly. We can trace it all the way to the invention of the earliest forms of writing and in particular its alphabetic form. This way of understanding analog-digital distinction was not explicitly formulated by von Neumann but can be identified in his explanation of the two types of machines. Analog information is encoded in an object or alternatively can be identified with its state, while digital information is the result of observation or measurement of this object. In the context of computation, the calculation by an analog machine operates on the states of the computing machine while in digital computing the operation involves measurement (e.g. reading of the tape of Turing machine).
The distinction between analog and digital information has been obscured by confusing terminology, especially by the use of the deceiving term “data.” Its Latin meaning, the plural form of “given” suggests the direct accessibility of information ignoring the stage of the transition from the encoding of information within an object (understood usually as what information is about) to the encoding of information in the specific format (frequently, but not always of numerical type). The transition is the process of observation or measurement. Naturally, this stage of the transformation of information was outside of the interest of those who were searching for the abstract mathematical process of calculation and was left outside of the description of information processing. The transformed information was simply “given,” but actually it was “taken” from the object by an observer, as it is reflected in the English expression for photographing as “taking a picture of something.” What was “given” by the object was considered identical to what was “taken” by the observer which with the advent of quantum mechanics became unwarranted. Thus, what commonly is called “data” (given) should be called using the Latin “capta” (taken). Data are most frequently inaccessible.
The distinction between a state and an observable has many precedents in philosophy. Probably the best-known analogy can be found in Immanuel Kant’s distinction of the thing as it is (state of the thing) and our human perception involving synthetic a priori apparatus of knowing (observable). In a much more practical context, von Neumann’s concern about the errors involved in analog computing is similar. However, the analog-digital distinction, upon careful reflection, rises from a marginal technical issue to the role of the one of most fundamental principles of the study of information and knowledge.
References
von Neumann, J. (1963). The General and Logical Theory of Automata. Ed. Taub, A. H., John von Neumann, Collected Works, Vol. V, Pergamon Press, Oxford, UK, 1963, pp. 288–326.
Papayannopoulos, P., Nir Fresco, N., and Shagrir, O. On Two Different Kinds of Computational Indeterminacy. The Monist 105 (2022): 229-246.
Schroeder, M.J. Theoretical Unification of the Fractured Aspects of Information. In Schroeder, M.J. & Hofkirchner, W. Eds. Understanding Information and Its Role as a Tool: In Memory of Mark Burgin. World Scientific, Singapore, 2025, pp. 131-185.
